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GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE SHARING IN ORGANISATIONS: 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS, MECHANISMS, AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
We discuss and test recent claims that research on knowledge processes has paid 
insufficient attention to micro (individual) level constructs and mechanisms and to the 
role of formal organisation in governing knowledge processes. We review knowledge 
sharing research published in thirteen (top academic plus top practitioner-oriented) 
journals in the period 1996-2006 in relation to these two propositions. The review 
confirms the claim that the knowledge sharing literature is pre-occupied with 
constructs, processes, and phenomena defined at a macro (collective, organisational) 
level and pay comparatively little attention to micro level constructs. However, our 
review provides less support for the proposition that formal governance mechanisms 
have been under-researched in comparison to formal organisation. Still, the multiple 
ways in which formal governance mechanisms may interact in influencing knowledge 
sharing outcomes have been under-researched, as have the interaction between more 
informal aspects of the firm and formal governance mechanisms. We develop a series 
of recommendations for future research on knowledge sharing.  
 
 
KEY WORDS: Governance mechanisms, knowledge sharing, levels of analysis, 
research agenda 
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INTRODUCTION 
If the doctrinal history of management research in the 1990s and the beginning of the new 
millennium ever comes to be written, a central ⎯ and perhaps the central ⎯ chapter will 
concern how “knowledge” became a dominant construct in multiple fields. Knowledge, 
considered both as a dependent and independent variable, has been a major research focus for 
various theoretical disciplines, such as philosophy, information and library  science, 
sociology, economics, cognitive psychology, as well as in management research (notably in  
strategic management, organisation theory, organisational behaviour, technology management 
and international business). All these disciplines and fields have contributed in various ways 
to debates centred around “knowledge” and its “management.” Jointly they have established a 
very broad discourse. Since the 1960s, social scientists and others have tried to utilize 
”knowledge” as a unit of analysis starting from simple attempts to categorize knowledge to 
the complex formulations existing today. Hull (2000, p. 59) summarised this development by 
pointing to the emergence of the general 
… notion that knowledge is an important entity, a unit of analysis, which presents 
particular types of problem which can no longer be left purely to philosophers, but 
which require the attention of various other experts. This provides for a variety of 
concepts, linkages, investigations, commentaries, labels, new language and re-
definitions of old language, and changes in practices and techniques.  
 While some authors cautiously note that knowledge has been added as “… a new 
‘contingency’ factor for understanding organisational arrangements” (Grandori in Grandori 
and Kogut, 2002, p. 225) or as a predictor of organisational arrangements (Birkenshaw, Nobel 
and Ridderstale, 2002), others view it as an independent construct that signals something 
bordering on a revolution in management thought (Spender, 1996; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 
2001). Whatever that is, few would contest that there is a shared conviction that the 
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management of knowledge stocks and flows has become a critical issue for competitive 
dynamics, international strategy, the building of resources, the boundaries of firms, and many 
other issues. In spite of the disciplinary pluralism that underpins the examination of 
knowledge and its management, it also seems that a number of themes have coalesced. A 
number of notions (e.g. absorptive capacity, (dynamic) capabilities, the 
exploration/exploitation trade-off) and taxonomies of knowledge dimensions (e.g. tacitness, 
stickiness, causal ambiguity) are now well established  and associated with theoretical 
insights, disciplinary underpinning, and accumulating empirical evidence.   
 “Knowledge governance” (i.e., choosing structures and mechanisms that can influence 
the processes of sharing and creating knowledge in preferred directions and towards preferred 
levels) has become a distinct issue in management and organisation (Foss and Michailova, 
2008). It is, however, a concept that has not yet been well explored and understood. The 
relationship between governance issues and knowledge processes remains under-researched, 
theoretically as well as empirically, not the least in comparison with the huge amount of 
writings concerning the characteristics of knowledge, knowledge taxonomies, how knowledge 
may be disseminated within and between organisations and the philosophical foundations of 
knowledge. As with any growing field, the knowledge (governance) field is characterised by 
existing gaps, problems, unresolved issues, and untested claims and propositions. Some of 
these have been identified in earlier contributions (e.g., Grandori, 1997, 2001; Foss, 2007; 
Michailova and Foss, 2008).  
 In this paper we examine two such recent propositions or claims. The first one relates to 
the level of constructs examined in the knowledge literature. Recent papers (Felin and Foss, 
2005; Felin and Hesterly, 2007; Foss, 2007; Salvato, 2007; Teece, 2007) point out that 
important constructs, such as capabilities, dynamic capabilities, absorptive capacity, 
communities of practice, etc. are collective-level constructs, usually firm-level ones. It is 
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furthermore argued that these constructs are not clearly rooted in (micro-) foundations of 
individual (inter)action, which is argued to imply that their origin and nature remain unclear. 
A second proposition relates to the nature of organisational factors examined in relation to 
knowledge processes. Foss (2007) argued that when organisational issues are discussed in 
relation to knowledge processes, “’organisation’ predominantly means ‘informal 
organisation’, that is, networks, culture, communities of practice and the like, rather than 
formal governance mechanisms” (Foss, 2007, p. 37). He points out that formal organisation 
may be invoked, but is “seldom if ever integrated into the analysis” and in general, “there is a 
neglect of formal organisation” (Foss, 2007, p. 37). 
We acknowledge that the knowledge literature is concerned with various kinds of 
knowledge processes (sharing, transfer, integration, accumulation, creation, utilisation) in 
many different contexts (intra/inter-firm, intra/inter-unit, inter-employee). However, to focus 
the examination of the two propositions, we limit our review, discussion and 
recommendations to knowledge sharing within organisations. We define knowledge sharing 
as the provision or receipt of task information, know how, and feedback on a product or a 
procedure (cf. Hansen, 1999). We conjecture that much of what we say about the knowledge 
sharing literature generalises to literatures on other knowledge processes; however, because of 
the sheer size and the diversity of the relevant work, a focused discussion is warranted.  
We focus on knowledge sharing for the following important reasons. First, as a practice 
knowledge sharing is designed to transform individual knowledge into organisational 
knowledge and, hence, it is a fertile context to analyse issues related to level of constructs. 
Second, sharing knowledge may lead to improved absorptive capacity, improved innovation 
capacity, and other capabilities. For example, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that a 
firm’s absorptive capacity is related to the amount of overlap between organisational 
members’ knowledge sets, an overlap that can be brought by knowledge sharing initiatives. 
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Nickerson and Zenger (2004) argued that knowledge sharing may be an important antecedent 
to problem-solving activities. Knowledge sharing therefore has the potential to contribute to 
sustained competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996; 
Argote and Paul, 2000). Third, while not all organisations engage in new knowledge creation, 
it is difficult to imagine modern organisational life without knowledge sharing processes 
taking place. Finally, executives and other practicing managers continue to be interested in 
explanations and predictions of how knowledge sharing can be steered in desired directions.  
In spite of a gestation period that is now well into its second decade (Nonaka, 1991) 
knowledge sharing is still an emerging field, for example, it is at the stage of initial 
identification, observation and definition of loosely recognised phenomena and their 
characteristics and contextual domains. Therefore, the key variables, relationships, and 
implications, and the testing of those, are by no means clear. In this light, the present paper is 
a sympathetic critique and an attempt to advance an important field. Accordingly, we discuss 
selected issues and explain how they have been dealt with. Our arguments lead into 
formulating research recommendations for a programme in the “governance of knowledge 
sharing” defined as the choice, combination and deployment of formal and informal 
organisational mechanisms to shape individual knowledge-sharing behaviour in organisations 
so that organisational knowledge-related goals (e.g., building absorptive capacity, obtaining a 
competitive advantage) can be achieved. 
ORGANISING FRAMEWORK AND SELECTION OF JOURNALS 
Micro and Macro Levels 
In order to test whether the existing literature is primarily concerned with collective-level 
phenomena, we utilise Coleman’s (1990) distinction between macro and micro levels of 
analysis and the resulting four types of links between them: macro-macro, macro-micro, 
micro-micro, and micro-macro links (cf. also Foss, 2007; Abell, Felin and Foss, 2008). In the 
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context of our paper, macro refers to the organisational level while micro is the level of 
individual action and interaction. Explanations focused merely on macro 
notions/processes/phenomena and/or embedded in macro-macro links tend to oversee, and 
often misunderstand and misrepresent complex underlying micro-level processes. There are 
no plausible mechanisms that directly link macro (organisation-level) variables (Coleman, 
1990). Translated to our framework and as illustrated in Figure 1, reliable explanation of 
organisation-level knowledge sharing must involve micro-level constructs (e.g. individual 
attitudes, intention, goals, motivation, behaviour, etc.), how these individual constructs 
aggregate up to a firm-level outcome, what are their firm-level determinants, how these 
determinants exert their influence, etc.  
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Literature Review 
In order to gain a systematic understanding of which level of analysis and which governance 
mechanisms have been the focus of attention in the knowledge sharing literature, we reviewed 
articles in thirteen top-tier management journals. We considered the journal lists comprised 
by Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992), Tahai and Meyer (1999), Werner (2002), and Podsakoff, 
Mackenzie, Bachrach, and Podsakoff (2005). These lists are comprehensive and have been 
consistently utilized and cited in subsequent reviews (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006; 
Tsui, Nifadkar and Ou, 2007). As a result, we selected the following journals: Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Management Science, Organization 
Science, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Strategic 
Management Journal. Our review work also included Journal of Applied Psychology and 
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Journal of Organizational Behavior, but a search against our three key terms did not result in 
any articles published in the considered period. We also included five academic journals with 
a strong focus on management practices: California Management Review, Harvard Business 
Review, Long Range Planning and MIT Sloan Management Review.  
We considered articles published between 1996 and 2006 against the keywords 
”knowledge sharing”, ”knowledge exchange”, and ”knowledge transfer”. These terms are 
often being used as interchangeable: sometimes authors refer to “knowledge transfer” while 
including “knowledge sharing” and/or “knowledge exchange” in their discussion (e.g. Levin 
and Cross, 2004), or treat “knowledge transfer” as the ultimate outcome of the “knowledge 
sharing” process (e.g. Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Tsai, 2002). Our search resulted in 100 
articles. Even though we made a serious effort to be thorough in our search, we acknowledge 
the possibility of having missed some articles hoping that the few potential unintentional 
omissions would not significantly modify our conclusions. 
Three researchers (one of those was an independent researcher who was not a part of the 
co-author team) independently reviewed the 100 articles in relation to the elements and 
arrows in Figure 1. In other words, the focus was on whether the articles considered 
organisational antecedents, conditions of knowledge sharing, individual knowledge sharing 
and knowledge-sharing outcomes as well as the four links between these constructs. To test 
the proposition whether the literature is pre-occupied with examining informal mechanisms at 
the cost of formal ones, the three raters also evaluated whether the articles that considered 
organisational antecedents looked into formal, informal or a combination of the two types of 
organizational antecedents. In the six instances of disagreement among the raters, a discussion 
was conducted until consensus was reached. Table I summarises our review.  
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
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-------------------------------------------- 
 Ideally, work on knowledge sharing would cover the four elements and arrows 1, 2 
and 3 in Figure 1. In other words, the literature would analyse organisation-level outcomes of 
knowledge sharing (north-eastern corner of Figure 1), or perhaps organisation-level 
knowledge sharing itself, as caused by some aggregation of individual knowledge-sharing 
efforts (arrow 3). These would be seen as influenced by the conditions that individuals find 
themselves in (i.e., the incentives they face, the beliefs they hold, etc.) (arrow 2), and the 
conditions would, in turn, be influenced by organisation-level variables (arrow 1). In 
principle, the latter could be any variable that may be placed on the organisational, rather than 
the individual, level, such as routines, culture, network characteristics, etc. as well as formal 
organisation. In other words, the argument that micro-foundations are needed does not 
amount to a rejection of collective level variables per se. Also, Figure 1 takes organisation-
level knowledge sharing as the explanandum phenomenon, and organisation as the ultimate 
antecedent.1 Of course, formal organisation is only “ultimate” in terms of the figure. Such 
organisation is, in turn, explainable in terms of the choice behaviour of organisational 
members. Bearing this in mind, we now turn to examining whether collective level notions 
and constructs are over-researched at the cost of individual level ones and whether formal 
antecedents have been largely under-researched as compared to informal organisational 
arrangements. The mapping of the literature summarised in Table I allows us also to examine 
to what extent authors have engaged in multilevel analysis and how often they have 
considered both formal and informal mechanisms in the same studies. 
EXAMINING MACRO-MICRO-MACRO LINKS AND THE ROLE OF 
ORGANISATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
Emphasis on the Macro Level and a Relative Neglect of the Micro Level 
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Many contributions to the organisation-knowledge link have a methodological collectivist 
orientation (Argote and Paul, 2000; Felin and Foss, 2005; Felin and Hesterly, 2007; Foss and 
Michailova, 2008). In other words, macro-micro, micro-micro, micro-macro analyses are 
seldom performed and instead the explanation takes place mainly on the collective level 
examining macro-macro links. Our review confirms the proposition that macro level notions 
and phenomena and macro-macro links are preferred among researchers in the knowledge 
sharing field. 71 of the 100 reviewed articles address macro-macro links (arrow 4 in Figure 
1). Only 10 studies explore macro-micro relationships, 16 studies examine micro-macro links 
and 20 studies analyse micro-micro interactions. This is hardly satisfactory. While work that 
involves macro-macro links may not always be methodologically illegitimate, what may 
secure such work its legitimacy is exactly when there are proven, well-known ways in which 
macro-macro links can be reduced to more fine-grained links that involve individuals and 
their interaction (Stinchcombe, 1991); because these ways are familiar, they can be left out of 
the explanation. Still, it remains that ontologically, there are no conceivable mechanisms that 
directly link one macro (organisational level) variable to another macro variable. Instead, 
links between macro variables are always mediated through individual action and interaction.2  
Macro-macro links are, methodologically speaking, shorthand for a more complex 
substructure of individual action and interaction. For example, organisational structure never 
directly impacts organisational performance; it may well effect an influence, but only 
indirectly, namely through influencing individual conditions, actions and interactions. While 
we do not accuse the literature on knowledge-sharing for indulging in methodological 
collectivist excesses ⎯ there is plenty of mention (if little analysis) of individual 
characteristics, motives, etc. ⎯, it seems reasonable to press the charge that the literature is 
not clear about the nature of the mechanisms implied by arrows 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 1.  
 10
 One manifestation of this is that the large majority of contributions to the knowledge-
sharing literature are not founded on clear assumptions about individual action/behaviour and 
the interaction of actions/behaviours. Thus, the studies listed in Table I generally do not 
explicate the assumptions made concerning the behavioural and cognitive set-up of agents.  
This is not to say that the theme has been entirely absent from the discussion. First, a few of 
the reviewed papers do handle the issue. For instance, Andrews and Delahaye (2000) examine 
the influence of the psychological filter on knowledge processes, Bouty (2000) focuses on 
interpersonal influences on informal resource exchange between individuals and Cabrera, 
Collins and Salgado (2006) examine determinants of individual engagement in knowledge 
sharing. Also, the main point in Osterloh and Frey (2000) is that the specific motivational 
assumptions that are made ⎯ extrinsic and intrinsic modes of motivation ⎯ matter a great 
deal to what is predicted concerning individual and organisation-level knowledge sharing 
outcomes. Specifically, building on the work of Edward Deci (e.g., 1972), they argue that 
extrinsic motivators, such as monetary rewards, have a tendency to crowd out intrinsic 
motivation, which may harm knowledge sharing, because it likely relies strongly on this kind 
of motivation.  
 Second, a number of papers that have not been included in the review (because they did 
not meet the criteria for being included) are explicit about underlying behavioural and 
cognitive assumptions. For example, a handful of authors  draw strongly on transaction cost 
economics, and therefore import the behavioural assumptions of opportunism and/or bounded 
rationality in their arguments (e.g., Contractor and Ra, 2002; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; 
Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Others, while more sceptical of transaction cost economics, are 
fully aware of the need to make explicit behavioural and cognitive assumptions in a 
knowledge sharing context; in particular, the latter assumptions are key in Grandori (1997, 
2001) and Lindenberg (2003).  Relatedly, motivational psychology has been explicitly used in 
a handful of contributions, particularly on the interface between knowledge sharing and 
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human resource management (e.g., Cabrera et al., 2006; Collins and Smith, 2006; Kane, 
Argote and Levine, 2005).  
 These are, however, exceptions from the general tendency of not being forthcoming 
about behavioural and cognitive assumptions. It is somewhat disturbing that out of the 100 
studies we reviewed, by far most of them, 81, are concerned with knowledge-sharing 
outcomes without paying serious attention to the micro-foundations of these outcomes. This 
general tendency is arguably the dominant reason why micro-level mechanisms are seldom 
explicitly theorised: if no specific assumptions are made about organisational members, it is 
difficult to meaningfully theorise their interaction, including how such interaction aggregates 
to organisation-level knowledge-sharing outcomes. If the literature remains being pre-
occupied with outcomes and the (macro-)link between organisational antecedents and those 
outcomes, it will remain difficult to explain and predict how organisational members react 
(e.g., with respect to their knowledge-sharing behaviour) to organisational processes and/or 
change projects. 
 In the absence of clear micro-foundations, research becomes predominantly descriptive 
(i.e., reports of events or accounts of social practices) rather than theoretical (i.e., explanation 
and prediction of behaviours based on systematic understandings of mechanisms), predictive 
and managerially relevant. To the extent that an attempt is made to inductively build theory 
from, for example, accounts of social practices, such theory has a tendency to be constructed 
in an aggregate mode. For example, attempts may be made to generalise from observed 
correlations between social practices in a firm and its pattern of knowledge-sharing 
behaviours, little attention being paid to the micro-mechanisms that initiate, mediate or 
moderate between these aggregate variables. We strongly believe that both theoretical and 
qualitative empirical work is justified and needed; a healthy feedback between empirical 
reality and theoretical work is necessary in virtually any discipline (see Nelson and Winter, 
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1982). However, knowledge-sharing research has suffered from too little attention to building 
micro-foundations in the form of making behavioural assumptions and building theoretical 
accounts of mechanisms. Note that this critique does not necessarily amount to a call for a 
unified “model of man,” such as is (or perhaps rather was) characteristic of economics; 
instead, the call is for making explicit behavioural assumptions and for explicitly identifying 
mechanisms in theorising. We outline what some of these assumptions and theories may be in 
the recommendation part of the paper. 
Organisational Antecedents in the Literature on Knowledge Sharing 
Organisational variables, that is, the north-western node in Figure 1, have no doubt been taken 
seriously in the knowledge-sharing literature. A first observation occurring from the mapping 
in Table I is that almost all studies have identified and examined organisational antecedents, 
to one extent or another, although these organisational antecedents vary widely and are 
conceptualised very differently, from broad conceptualizations of “organizational control” in 
general (Turner and Makhija, 2006) to individual organisational practices, such as reward 
systems (McEvily, Das and McCabe, 2000), mobility (Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003), 
personal rotation (Kane et al., 2005) and leadership (Srivastava, Bartol and Locke, 2006).  
A second observation is that Table I does not support the notion that informal 
organisational antecedents have been over-emphasised relative to formal ones. It is true that 
much of the literature has focused on informal organisational factors. An example of this type 
of studies would be the examination of how network relations influence communication 
channels in organisations, and how such channels determine knowledge-sharing outcomes at 
organisational level. At the same time, several studies actually address the formal governance 
of knowledge, and it is does not appear from the table that informal organisation has been 
over-emphasized at the expense of formal organisation.  
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Looking beyond the table, in organisational economics, there is a long standing thesis 
that alliances involving complex tasks and knowledge transfers should be regulated through 
formal proprietary agreements (e.g., Heiman and Nickerson, 2002, 2004). Also, a prominent 
argument is that the formal and proprietary governance regime of the firm itself has special 
properties in the governance of knowledge exchanges where markets fail (see, from very 
different perspectives, Kogut and Zander [1992] and Nickerson and Zenger [2004]). In 
organisation studies the role of formal integration roles and proprietary integration 
mechanisms in knowledge–intensive situations has also been highlighted (e.g. Davenport and 
Prusak, 1998; Grandori, 1997, 2001; Grant, 1996; and many others listed in Table I). 
A third observation is, however, that very few studies have simultaneously addressed 
formal and informal organisational antecedents. Out of 100 articles that take on board the 
issue of antecedents, only 14 discuss both types. This situation is difficult to justify, because 
even in perspectives adopted by studies on informal antecedents, formal organisation must 
also matter; for example, (informal) patterns of communication are influenced by 
organisational structure (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and formal organisation influences 
network positions and network relations by defining tasks, task composition, roles, etc. 
While organisational antecedents have made prominent appearances in recent research 
on knowledge sharing, there is a relative lack of concern for how these antecedents are related 
to individual knowledge-sharing behaviours (via arrows 1 and 2) and therefore ultimately to 
knowledge-sharing outcomes (via arrow 3). Thus, it is often unclear in the literature through 
exactly which mechanisms organisational variables exercise their influence on organisation-
level knowledge-sharing outcomes. A number of studies listed in Table I apply 
team/group/network/community ideas to knowledge sharing (e.g. Bechky, 2003; Dyer and 
Hatch, 2004, 2006; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Hansen, 2005, Inkpen and Tsang 2005). 
However, work that applies network ideas to knowledge sharing typically suffers from lack of 
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concern with critical micro-issues. Building on Granovetter (1973) and Winter (1987), 
Hansen (1999) argued ⎯ and empirically substantiated ⎯ that intra-organisational 
knowledge sharing affects project completion time. He argued that although weakly tied 
project teams have an advantage in terms of search ability, such teams have a problem 
transferring highly complex knowledge, because they are likely to incur transfer problems due 
to poor interaction with the source unit.  
Although actors are by no means neglected in network analysis, the approach does not 
go very far with respect to accounting for individual interests, knowledge, beliefs, 
preferences, expectations, etc., ⎯ surely critical ingredients in micro-foundations for 
management research. For example, motivational issues are usually side-stepped in network 
research. Network analysis may allow for an account of how “organisation” impacts firm-
level knowledge sharing outcomes through the mechanisms implied by arrows 1, 2 and 3 in 
Figure 1. However, since little attention is paid to individual actors, as relations are the key 
unit of analysis, network analysis risks neglecting potentially important results of individual 
action; the account will be quite circumscribed. For example, network position is usually not 
made endogenous to the analysis. If organisational members may benefit from specific 
positions in a knowledge sharing network, competition for those positions will arise. How 
will such competition be resolved, that is, who will end up with the favourable positions? 
How many resources will be consumed in the rent-seeking scramble for favourable positions? 
How will this impact organisational knowledge sharing? Such questions are usually not 
posed, much less resolved, in the network analysis literature, and indeed in the knowledge-
sharing literature at large.  
Managerially Relevant Knowledge Management? 
Given that knowledge management emerged as a highly practice-influenced research field, it 
is striking that the research in this field is not more normative. For example, the 
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organisational behaviour grounded studies on knowledge sharing are silent about what it 
actually means to establish and nurture a knowledge-sharing friendly culture/climate and how 
managers can go about it. Likewise, the research stream that is influenced by sociological 
network theory has only little normative content; it is not forthcoming with respect to how 
management can influence network positions and relations in order to govern knowledge 
sharing. Typically, this would be done through changing departmentalisation, specialisation, 
etc., that is, formal organisation.  
The lack of attention to micro-foundations is, we submit, an important reason for the 
relative lack of managerial advice from the various knowledge management research streams.  
As Coleman (1990: 1-23) argues, interventions designed to change a variable at a macro level 
are often naturally made at lower levels. For example, building a firm-level capability may 
require that certain employees with particular educational backgrounds, experiences, character 
traits, etc. are hired, socialised, and remunerated in specific ways. However, such intervention 
obviously requires significant knowledge about what goes on at the micro levels. Research 
that is not based on clear micro-foundations has difficulties supplying practitioners with such 
knowledge. 
Relatedly, if research only considers formal or informal organisation, and abstracts from 
their interaction, and also does not specifically trace out how different kinds of organisation 
impact knowledge sharing behaviours, there is a tendency to lose out in the normative 
dimension. In contrast, a concern with both formal and informal organisational factors and 
antecedents has the potential to devise meaningful and efficient organisation.  This is hardly 
surprising as many of informal factors, such as culture, are semi-permanent traits of an 
organisation that may be harder to change than formal arrangements, such as organisational 
structure, reward systems, etc.  
 As a result of these shortcomings, managers are not optimally equipped to make 
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decisions about how to embed knowledge-sharing initiatives in existing organisational 
structure and culture, and they lack robust models for assessing the organisational costs and 
benefits of engaging in knowledge sharing. This is difficult to continue to justify, especially 
in the light of recent calls for the need for “evidence-based management”, that is, 
management that is associated with making decisions that integrate the best available 
research evidence with decision maker expertise to guide practice toward more desirable 
results (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006; Rousseau, 2006).   
SETTLED AND OPEN ISSUES AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Settled Issues in Knowledge Management 
While it is always potentially dangerous to declare any issues in a(ny) scientific field for 
“settled,” there are at least issues around which a strong degree of consensus exists. A closer 
look into the articles reviewed in Table I suggests that the knowledge sharing literature has 
yielded numerous insights that are now commonly accepted and that, we think, are rather 
uncontroversial. We outline those insights below. 
Epistemological issues. While discussions of the nature of knowledge and on the “practical 
epistemology” of knowledge sharing in organisations have shed light on different 
knowledge forms, the marginal returns to further epistemological inquiry seem to be 
declining rather steeply. In particular, the tacit/explicit knowledge distinction is well 
established (e.g., Nonaka, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Hedlund, 1994; Grant, 1996; 
Spender, 1996; Argote and Paul, 2000; Osterloh and Frey, 2000; von Krogh et al., 2001; 
Almeida and Phene, 2004), and its main implications ⎯ for example, that costs of sharing 
and integrating knowledge differ as a function of the characteristics of knowledge, and that 
tacitness may contribute to the sustainability of competitive advantage ⎯ is generally 
accepted, and heavily researched in a number of contexts (idem.). What is needed on this 
particular issue is rather more operationalisation and measurement than discussion of the 
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basic issues (however, for a different view, see Spender, 2005). To the extent that further 
epistemological discussion may be needed, it should (consistent with our previous 
discussion) mainly concern the under-researched issues of understanding the different in 
organisations levels at which knowledge can be held (cf. Felin and Hesterly, 2007) and how 
these levels are linked in terms of individual action and interaction.  
Knowledge dimensions. Although the literature continues suggesting different dimensions of 
knowledge related units of analysis, nevertheless certain dimensions have become dominant 
and attracted enough interest to be empirically tested. Examples include knowledge tacitness 
(Winter, 1987; Athanassiou and Nigh, 1999; Subramaniam and Venkatraman, 2001), 
knowledge “appropriability” (Oxley, 1997; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), knowledge “novelty” 
(Contractor and Ra, 2002) and knowledge stickiness (Szulanski, 1996, 2000). While 
suggesting and coining new dimensions is a natural part of the effort to understand deeper 
knowledge-related units of analysis, we argue that the field is in more need of testing 
empirically already established dimensions and that proposing new dimensions should be 
centred around hypothesising how governance mechanisms vary systematically with these 
dimensions. To be clear, we are not against theorising about and examining (new) dimensions 
of knowledge; in our context, their importance relates to the fact that different dimensions are 
associated with different sharing costs and the choice of governance mechanisms partially 
reflects such costs (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Oxley and Sampson, 2004).  
While recommending a pluralistic attitude here, we also think it is crucial to be explicit 
about the unit of analysis one has adopted. Several of the articles listed in our review are not 
clear about the unit of analysis. As a matter of fact, it is reasonable to speculate that the failure 
to be explicit about the unit of analysis may be a key contributor to the absence of micro 
foundations in knowledge sharing research.3  Thus, if the knowledge related unit of analysis is 
a firm or business unit level capability, this is likely to tie in less naturally with a micro-focus 
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than if the unit of analysis is a knowledge transaction between two parties (Heiman and 
Nickerson, 2004) or a “problem,” as seen, for example, from the point of view of the 
management team (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004).  
Open Issues  
While a consensus may be emerging, or have already emerged, with respect to the above 
points (or at least concerning their importance), other issues remain considerably more open. 
Some of them are “open” in the sense that while they may be well-known, they remain 
under-researched. One important example concerns the performance benefits of knowledge 
sharing. While many benefits have been argued to stem from knowledge sharing (e.g., 
productivity improvement, increased innovativeness), rather little work exists that actually 
attempts to quantify such benefits (but see Haas and Hansen, 2005). In contrast, we find 
very little explicit awareness in the literature of the need to forge clear micro-foundations for 
the link between organizational antecedents (whether informal organizational phenomena or 
formal governance mechanisms) and organization level knowledge sharing outcomes. We 
now spell out in greater detail what are the under-researched issues and outline 
recommendations for future research. Starting from the north-western corner in Figure 1 and 
based on our mapping of the knowledge sharing literature, we identify a number of 
questions that we see as still unresolved.  
What are the relevant organisational antecedents (and facilitators)? While the knowledge 
sharing literature collectively addresses an impressive number of potential organisational 
antecedents of knowledge sharing, are there certain antecedents that are likely to have a 
stronger impact on knowledge-sharing behaviour and organisational outcomes than others?4 
Implicitly, recent literature on knowledge sharing (cf. Table I) considers informational 
networks to very important antecedents, at least judging from the large number of (highly 
cited) papers in top journals that have addressed knowledge sharing from a network 
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perspective (e.g., Hansen, 2002; Dyer and Hatch, 2004, 2006; Tsai, 2001). Also, direct 
monetary rewards have attracted considerable attention (e.g. Osterloh and Frey, 2000; 
Cabrera et al., 2006). However, in principle, virtually any organisational antecedent ⎯ 
reward systems, job descriptions, managerial style, corporate culture, capabilities, etc. ⎯ can 
be argued to matter for individual knowledge-sharing behaviour and organisational-level 
outcomes. It does not seem possible to place a lot of apriori restrictions on the set of relevant 
antecedents (see Grandori [2001] for an attempt).  
 Given this, one approach may be to engage in empirical work designed to uncover the 
relative contributions of different organisational antecedents to knowledge sharing outcomes, 
that is, essentially treat each organisational antecedent as an independent variable in properly 
specified regression models. Such work can become quite messy, because of the sheer 
number of potential variables that can be included.    
 One possibility is to restrict analytical attention to those organisational antecedents that 
can be manipulated rather directly by management, such as information systems, incentive 
schemes, allocations of decision rights and authority, etc. (and perhaps treat the less easily 
manipulable antecedents as control variables).  In a knowledge sharing context, a working 
hypothesis then is that such governance mechanisms are deployed in the belief that 
influencing the conditions of actions (the south-western node in Figure 1) in a certain manner 
leads employees to make those knowledge sharing decisions (the south-eastern node) that, 
when aggregated (arrow 3), lead to favourable organisational knowledge sharing outcomes 
(the north-eastern node). Indeed, some research included in Table I examines these issues. 
However, very little systematic knowledge exists concerning many of the key issues.  For 
example, there is extremely little knowledge about how such a fundamental organisational 
phenomenon as (job) specialisation impacts knowledge sharing.  
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Research recommendation I: Research on knowledge sharing needs to develop a 
comprehensive and systematic approach to identifying the relative contributions of 
organisational antecedents to knowledge sharing outcomes. A first step in such a 
research strategy may be to begin with those antecedents that can be construed as 
levers that can be activated by management.   
Complementary and substituting organisational mechanisms. As noted already in the 
paper, some organisational mechanisms may complement each other with respect to the 
impact on knowledge-sharing behaviour, while other mechanisms may be substitutes. For 
example, a strong corporate culture that stresses general sharing behaviour (e.g., in the form 
of organisational citizenship behaviour) may substitute (within certain ranges) for explicit 
incentive pay (and vice versa) in the coordination of knowledge-sharing activities. Formal 
organisational arrangements and informal organisational practices may be complementary to 
each other with respect to their impact on knowledge sharing. For example, the effect of 
explicit incentives on knowledge sharing may be increased by the presence of a culture that 
accepts substantial pay differences across employees. On the other hand, studies have 
documented that formal organisational mechanisms (introducing extrinsic rewards in terms 
of payment) may act against existing informal patterns and practices (intrinsically motivated 
organisational members) and such a combination may destroy knowledge sharing behaviour 
and course irreversible, long-term negative effects on organisational behaviour (Osterloh 
and Frey, 2000; Robertson and Swan, 2003). Hence, we propose the following 
Research recommendation II: Research on knowledge sharing in organisations should 
build knowledge about the interaction between discrete organisational (governance) 
mechanisms  (in terms of substitutability or complementarity) with respect to knowledge 
sharing.  
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Formal and informal organisational antecedents. Both formal and informal organisational 
mechanisms are crucial to the understanding of the governance of knowledge sharing. One set 
of issues concerns their relative importance. A second set of issues relates to the points about 
substitutability and complementarity we have mentioned above: Are formal and informal 
organisational mechanisms substitutes or complements, or more precisely, which mechanisms 
are substitutes and which are complements? Are these relationships influenced by how 
mechanisms are bundled? How do formal and informal elements of organisation interact with 
respect to influencing knowledge sharing? It is generally recognised that informal 
organisational mechanisms are influenced by formal ones. A famous case is Homans’ (1950) 
re-analysis of the bank-wiring room from the Hawthorne studies, demonstrating the existence 
of strong group norms with a significant element of enforcement. However, the background to 
those norms was the formal group piece-rate incentive system designed to increase 
productivity at the Western Electric Hawthorne Works in Chicago5. This aspect of formal 
organisation defined the parameters of interaction: The group piece-rate system did not 
directly determine behaviour, but it fostered a need for norms that could curb shirking. And 
these norms were more directly determinative of behaviour.  
We may see a similar dynamic in the governance of knowledge sharing processes. 
Research has documented the importance of dysfunctional norms in knowledge sharing 
processes, such as “knowledge sharing hostility” in the former East Bloc countries 
(Michailova and Husted, 2003). It can be hypothesised that the adoption of specific 
mechanisms can ultimately erode such norms and that in order for these mechanisms to lead 
to desired outcomes, they need to be context-specific. Context, defined at different levels, is 
important for examining any issues relevant to organisations, including knowledge sharing 
governance. Organisations embedded in certain national cultural and institutional contexts 
understand and deal with knowledge sharing issues differently from those located in other 
macro environments. Michailova and Husted (2003) pointed out that knowledge sharing in 
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traditional Russian organisations can be achieved via direct instructions and negative 
sanctions of behaviour that deviates from the looked-for behaviour. In turn, such actions may 
help to build a beneficial knowledge sharing culture.  
 While informal organisation can be influenced by the deployment of formal 
organisation, there is no simple correspondence between the two and the lag-structure is not 
only complicated, but also long-termed. Managers who wish to influence knowledge sharing 
by influencing informal organisation must take considerable ambiguity and inertia into 
account. Changes in formal organisation can function as signals to organisational members. 
Such signals may in turn strongly influence the relations between management and 
employees. However, it is clear that these processes are surrounded by much ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Is a decision to formally reward knowledge sharing behaviour a signal that the 
organisation is shifting to a “gain frame” with a general emphasis on short term maximizing 
behaviour? Or is it rather a signal that the organisation places much value on knowledge 
sharing and that knowledge sharing behaviour in general is welcomed?  
Research recommendation III: Research on knowledge sharing in organisations should 
build knowledge about the interaction effects between formal and informal organisation, 
and how formal and informal organisation impact each other with respect to knowledge 
sharing outcomes.  
While the kind of research advocated in research recommendation I - III may begin from 
correlations between aggregate variables (i.e., the top arrow in Figure 1), according to the 
argument in this paper we can only understand why some antecedents may matter more than 
others by looking at the level of individual action and interaction. For example, whether a 
reward for knowledge sharing has negative or positive consequences for organisation-level 
knowledge sharing may depend on the prevailing culture. However, why this is so is hard to 
grasp in lieu of understanding of how organisational culture at least partly primes the 
 23
perceptions of organisational members.  
How do organisational antecedents impact organisational members’ knowledge sharing 
behaviour? In the approach we advocate, explanation fundamentally involves the individual 
agent. This implies making specific, explicit assumptions about individual agents’ 
perceptions, beliefs, preferences, knowledge, incentives, etc. In relation to governance 
mechanisms, a key question is how such mechanisms influence individual organisational 
members and the knowledge sharing processes in which these members are involved (Figure 
1, arrow 1).  
Logically and temporally, the first issue to consider is that of perception: Organisational 
antecedents impact the conditions of actions of organisational members (arrow 1) partly 
through these members’ perceptions. For example, while some members may identify 
strongly with their organisation, others may not buy into and internalise organisational values 
and beliefs. Also, individual employees may perceive managerial style differently, or 
employees may, as a group, perceive managerial style differently from the manager’s 
intentions. In turn, organisational antecedents are placed in and cannot be separated from 
organisational members’ interpretive frames (Lindenberg, 2003). How do these perception 
and interpretation processes impact the choices that organisational members make with 
respect to their knowledge-sharing choices? According to a substantial literature in 
psychology research, cognitive framing may strongly impact motivation (Lindenberg, 2003). 
If specific kinds of organisation, such as high-powered performance incentives or extensive 
monitoring, are perceived as controlling, this can reduce intrinsic motivation in general and 
intrinsic motivation to share knowledge in particular. Thus, perception and motivation may be 
intertwined through framing effects.  
The subtlety of this is lost when one insists on separating cognition and motivation, as 
transaction cost scholars typically do.  While we are sympathetic to the application of the 
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behavioural assumptions of transaction cost economics ⎯ that is, bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Williamson, 1996) ⎯, as these allow for a clear identification of the 
organisational and exchange hazards that a micro-oriented perspective on knowledge sharing 
should consider (cf. Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), these 
behavioural assumptions may still be too coarse. “Bounded rationality” is associated with 
various phenomena and “opportunism” manifests itself in multiple ways. Similarly, a more 
sophisticated view of motivation (as in Osterloh and Frey, 2000) that is conventional in 
organisational economics must be included. A more nuanced view of motivation, one that is 
informed by advances in social psychology and organisational behaviour, is likely to better 
capture the complexity of the mechanisms that link governance mechanisms and knowledge 
processes (Grandori, 1997, 2001; Lindenberg, 2003; Osterloh and Frey, 2000).    
For example, Osterloh and Frey (2000) examine how knowledge transfer is influenced 
by organisational design. This research question is embedded in a broader discussion of how 
firms increasingly introduce market elements to exploit the advantages of price mechanisms, 
by making exchanges between departments or actors more explicit and enabling them to 
reward according to the contribution to a firm’s profit. In order to theorise the mechanisms 
lying between organisational variables and organisational-level knowledge sharing, the 
authors identify a number of exchange hazards that beset internal knowledge transactions. 
They argue that the transfer of tacit knowledge cannot be accomplished by contracting, and 
that employees cannot be sanctioned for holding back tacit knowledge. Therefore, managing 
individual motivation becomes central. Firms have access to mechanisms (that markets don’t) 
to manage intrinsic motivation, such as participation. Participation signifies agreement on 
common goals and raises employees’ self-determination and personal relationships which 
lead to establishing psychological contracts based on emotional loyalties. This, in turn, raises 
the intrinsic motivation to cooperate. In contrast, too heavy-handed use of market-like 
incentives may destroy intrinsic motivation (i.e., the “crowding out effect”). To develop the 
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argument the authors rely on psychological theories of individual motivation, notably the 
motivation crowding effect first identified in an experimental setting by Deci (1972).  
While important beginnings thus exist, it is arguable that knowledge management 
scholars have so far merely scratched the surfaces of the very rich bodies of motivational and 
cognitive psychology. For example, while most scholars continue to work with a simple 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, motivational psychologists have 
introduced much richer taxonomies of and corresponding insights into motivation (e.g., Deci 
and Gagné, 2005). Similarly, psychology-based insights on cognition also need to be brought 
into the discussion of knowledge sharing to the extent that the perceptions and cognitions of 
organisational members are seen as important for the knowledge sharing process (for an 
excellent beginning, see Lindenberg, 2003). 
Research recommendation IV: Research on knowledge sharing in organisations 
should not only build from clear assumptions about individual organisational 
members’ cognition and motivation in order to capture the complexity of the 
mechanisms that link governance mechanisms and knowledge processes; they should 
go beyond the simple intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy and incorporate richer models of 
cognition. 
An emphasis on individual motivation and cognition not only implies being detailed about 
how governance mechanisms impact on these dimensions of organisational members; it also 
means taking into account the apriori heterogeneity of organisational members (Felin and 
Hesterly, 2007). Thus, individuals are not likely to be identically disposed to share 
knowledge, and governance mechanisms will have different effects on different 
organisational members’ knowledge sharing propensities. Formally, such effects may be 
interpreted as exogenous variables (representing, e.g., personality traits) that moderate arrow 
2.  
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 How do knowledge sharing behaviours aggregate to the organisational level? A final 
under-researched issue concerns how knowledge sharing on the level of organisational 
members adds up to organisational level knowledge sharing (arrow 3 in Figure 1). At first 
glance, this issue may seem to be reducible to simply summing all the individual knowledge 
sharing activities. However, this neglects that individual level knowledge sharing may be 
redundant, so that, for example, the same knowledge is shared with the same organisational 
members by different organisational members. Such redundancy is likely to be wasteful 
from the point of view of the organisation. Thus, the aggregation issue directly raises the 
issue of what is optimum organisational knowledge sharing, and therefore introduces a 
feedback loop from the north-eastern node in figure 1 to the north-western one: governance 
mechanisms should be designed, taking into account their implications for organisational 
knowledge sharing (e.g., Heiman and Nickerson, 2004).  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Almost two decades ago, Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) pointed out that knowledge 
transfer within organisations (in contrast to between organisations) was very much a black 
box. To be sure, much has happened in the meantime with respect to the academic treatment 
of knowledge in and between organisations since then. In particular, distinctive, organized 
ways of thinking about knowledge in and between organisations have emerged, arguably 
making “knowledge” more than simply another contingency factor. The “knowledge-based 
theory” of the firm (e.g., Grant, 1996; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004) is an example. So is the 
related theoretical development that has been called “knowledge governance” (Grandori, 
1997, 2001; Foss, 2007; Michailova and Foss, 2008), as are various applications of 
transaction cost economics and other organisational economics ideas to the understanding of 
the efficient governance of knowledge processes (e.g., Oxley, 1997; Oxley and Sampson, 
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2004).   
However, as argued, there are still important black box dimensions of the 
understanding of knowledge sharing in organisations, and how it can be influenced by 
organisational means. We have reviewed existing studies in relation to the role of 
organisational mechanisms and micro-foundations as two specific areas in the knowledge 
sharing literature where our knowledge is still fragmented. That these are under-researched 
areas have been claimed in various earlier contributions (e.g., Felin and Hesterly, 2007; Foss, 
2007). Although we broadly agree that these two areas are indeed where major challenges (if 
not necessarily the only ones) lie, we have been able to add considerable nuance to these 
claims.  
First, our review reveals that it is not in general correct that the governance of 
knowledge sharing is a neglected area. To be sure, the literature is not in agreement 
concerning important issues such as the nature of key constructs, what are the relevant 
dimensions of the constructs, etc. However, work that explicates the link between governance 
mechanisms and knowledge sharing outcomes does exist, much of it empirical (e.g., Foss, 
2003; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2006; Macher, 2006). For 
example, hypothesis development relating to how firms leverage organisational control and 
structural mechanisms to promote knowledge sharing (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Chang 
and Harrington, 2003; Teece, 2000; Turner and Makhija, 2006), research into how 
governance mechanisms are deployed to knowledge-based strategic alliances (Heimeriks and 
Duyster, 2007; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Oxley, 1997; Oxley and Sampson, 
2004), the understanding of the governance of human and social capital (Child and McGrath, 
2001; Teece, 2003; Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001), the link between control of 
knowledge assets and the appropriation of surplus from relations (Coff, 1999; Coff and 
Blyler, 2003), and the provision of incentives to knowledge workers (Osterloh and Frey, 
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2000), have been framed in ways that are akin to the research questions we pose. The body of 
existing empirical work is not large, but it is growing. We take it as evidence of the 
fruitfulness of the overall approach we advocate. 
However, it remains that even if the governance/knowledge sharing nexus is addressed 
in an expanding literature, many points raised by this nexus have not yet been addressed at all.  
Our research recommendations have centred on these. In particular, more attention needs to 
be devoted to understanding interaction effects between governance mechanisms in 
influencing knowledge sharing outcomes, and the corresponding empirical work needs to be 
done. This is admittedly challenging, because multi-level issues complicate such empirical 
work (cf. Klein, Dansereau and Hall, 1994; Dansereau, Yammarino and Kohles, 1997), and 
because proper standards for testing for, for example, complementarity of governance 
mechanisms are only emerging (Athey and Stern, 2003). Moreover, data needs to be collected 
at different levels of analysis, in actual research practice often quite a challenge. Such 
difficulties may explain why we see so little empirical knowledge sharing research that is 
genuinely multi-level in nature.6 However, enthusiasm for multi-level methods and insights 
has been emerging in management research for more than a decade (Klein et al., 1994; 
Dansereau et al., 1997), based on the recognition that many, perhaps most, management 
issues are inherently multi-level, and therefore necessitates multi-level approaches. 
 We furthermore submit that the kind of research we have called for is necessary for 
more pragmatic reasons: if the knowledge sharing literature is to soundly (i.e., based on 
research evidence) confront a number of important real-life managerial issues related to 
knowledge sharing, it needs to come to grips with the inherent multi-level of knowledge 
sharing. Executives of knowledge-intensive organisations are ready to absorb insights and 
evidence that can assist them to deal with knowledge sharing challenges. At least our own 
consulting and empirical research experience suggests that they are increasingly explicit in 
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their desire to “go beyond data-bases” and want to know how concrete governance 
mechanisms shape their employees’ actual knowledge sharing behaviour and, as they apply 
several mechanisms simultaneously, how those interact and what are the effects of these 
interactions on knowledge sharing in the organisation.  
As Whetten (1998: 492) argued in an oft-cited paper on theory-building, “… one way to 
demonstrate the value of a proposed change … is to identify how this change affects the 
accepted relationships between the variables”. Which relationships are our suggestions 
(potentially) changing? Correlations between macro variables may well remain; however, the 
point is that paying attention to the level of individual action and interaction in knowledge 
sharing explains why such correlations exist. According to Whetten this is “… probably the 
most fruitful, but also the most difficult avenue of theory development” (1998: 493).  
Moreover, the approach we have advocated can potentially refine “accepted relationships” 
and yield insights in new relationships. For example, work on how explicit incentives (e.g., 
monetary rewards) influence knowledge sharing behaviour is ambiguous: some argue that 
such incentives may drive out the intrinsic motivation that is necessary for unhampered 
knowledge sharing (e.g., Osterloh and Frey, 2000), while others argue that there are situations 
where such incentives may very well promote knowledge sharing (Michailova and Husted, 
2003). These mixed finding may be interpreted in various ways. One is that the outcome may 
be dependent on whether incentives are applied in isolation or together with other governance 
mechanisms or managerial actions (e.g., praise). To understand this, however, more 
theoretical as well as empirical research into how exactly governance mechanisms influence 
individual motivation to share knowledge is needed, particularly concerning interaction 
effects between governance mechanisms.  
Another aspect which remains under-researched and where considerably more attention 
to the issue of organisational mechanisms and how they relate to individual action and 
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interaction is needed is the situation-specific nature of knowledge sharing benefits: what is an 
appropriate pattern of knowledge sharing behaviours (and hence mechanisms for influencing 
the desired behaviour) under certain circumstances may be directly damaging under others. 
Thus, there are situations where knowledge sharing is much less desirable, for example, 
because it is too costly, it increases the risk of knowledge spill-overs to an unacceptable level, 
or because it reinforces group-think, and hampers innovation. To maximize net benefits over 
time from knowledge sharing, managers not only need to be aware of such different 
situations, they also need to know how they can call forth desired knowledge sharing 
behaviors by means of deploying the proper governance mechanisms.  
In general, it is timely for research on knowledge sharing to pay more attention to the 
link between knowledge sharing and organisational performance. Research has by now 
advanced in terms of both quality and quantity to reach the point of starting providing detailed 
answers about the link between knowledge sharing and performance benefits. Managers need 
systematic knowledge on this link (as well as what and how moderates the link) in order to be 
able to make sense of organisational members’ behaviours they try to shape and govern. 
However, the link between knowledge sharing and organisational outcomes also involves the 
level of individuals and their interaction. For example, the increased organisation-level 
problem-solving capacity (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), or product innovation performance (Tsai, 2001) that may result from 
knowledge sharing happens because of the individual-level effects (e.g., higher individual 
problem-solving capacity) that knowledge sharing may foster in conjunction with the right 
governance mechanisms (cf. also Gottschalg and Zollo, 2007).   
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Table I: Articles on Knowledge Sharing in 13 Top Journals, 1996-2006 
 
No. Journals and Authors 
A. Organisational 
antecedents 
B. 
Conditions 
of action 
C. 
Individual 
actions 
D. Knowledge- 
sharing outcomes 
Arrow 
1 
Arrow 
2 
Arrow 
3 
Arrow 
4 
  Formal Informal        
Academy of Management Journal          
1 Bouty, 2000  X X X  X    
2 Tsai, 2001  X   X   X X 
3 Cross and Cummings, 2004  X X X  X  X  
4 McFadyen and Cannella Jr, 2004  X  X    X  
5 Hansen et al., 2005  X   X  X  X 
6 Smith et al., 2005  X X X X    X 
7 Srivastava et al., 2006  X  X X    X 
8 Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006 X  X  X    X 
9 Collins and Smith, 2006 X  X X X X X X X 
Academy of Management Review          
10 McEvily et al., 2000 X    X    X 
11 Bhagat et al., 2002  X X  X    X 
12 Tallman et al., 2004  X X  X    X 
13 Inkpen and Tsang., 2005  X   X    X 
14 Turner and Makhija, 2006 X    X    X 
15 Coff et al. 2006 X   X X    X 
16 Nebus, 2006  X X X   X   
Administrative Science Quarterly           
17 Hansen, 1999  X   X    X 
18 Ahuja, 2000  X   X    X 
19 Reagans and McEvily, 2003  X X X   X   
Journal of Management          
20 Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005 X X   X    X 
21 Matusik and Heeley, 2005 X X X  X    X 
22 Schulze and Hoegl, 2006    X X   X  
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Journal of Management Studies          
23 Lam, 1996 X    X    X 
24 Andrews and Delahaye, 2000   X X   X   
25 Hardy et al., 2003  X   X     
26 Bloodgood and Morrow Jr, 2003 X    X    X 
27 Dyck et al., 2005 X    X    X 
28 Zhao and Anand, 2005  X   X    X 
29 Michailova and Hutchings, 2006  X X X  X X   
30 Inkpen and Pien, 2006  X X  X    X 
31 Watson and Hewitt, 2006 X  X X X  X X  
Management Science          
32 Lapré and Wassenhove, 2001 X X   X    X 
33 Li, 2002 X    X    X 
34 Ingram and Simons, 2002  X   X X   X 
35 Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003  X X  X    X 
     36 Thomas-Hunt et al., 2003  X X X   X   
37 Zellmer-Bruhn, 2003 X   X X    X 
38 Song et al., 2003 X    X    X 
39 Chang and Harrington Jr, 2003 X    X    X 
40 Levin and Cross, 2004  X X X   X   
41 Gray and Meister, 2004   X X    X  
42 Cummings, 2004  X  X X   X X 
43 Singh, 2004  X   X    X 
44 Kuk, 2006  X  X      
Organization Science          
45 Inkpen and Dinur, 1998 X  X  X    X 
46 Shenkar and Li, 1999 X    X    X 
47 Osterloh and Frey, 2000 X    X  X  X 
48 Tsai, 2002 X X   X    X 
49 Birkinshaw et al., 2002 X  X       
50 Almeida et al., 2002 X X   X    X 
51 Hansen, 2002  X   X    X 
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52 Bechky, 2003   X  X     
53 Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004 X  X  X    X 
54 Szulanski et al., 2004   X  X     
Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes       
55 Gruenfeldf et al., 2000 X    X    X 
56 Paulusf and Yang, 2000    X X   X  
57 Szulanski, 2000  X X  X    X 
58 Darra and Kurtzberg, 2000  X   X X   X 
59 Alge et al., 2003 X  X X X X X  X 
60 Kane et al., 2005  X X  X    X 
Strategic Management Journal          
61 Spender and Grant, 1996          
62 Appleyard, 1996   X       
63 Szulanski, 1996  X   X  X X X 
64 Mowery et al., 1996 X    X    X 
65 Simonin, 1999  X   X    X 
66 Athanassiou and Nigh, 1999  X   X    X 
67 Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000a X    X  X  X 
68 Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000  X   X    X 
69 Subramaniam and Venkatraman, 2001 X    X    X 
70 Yli-Renko et al., 2001  X   X    X 
71 Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002  X   X    X 
72 Tsang, 2002 X    X    X 
73 Spencer, 2003 X    X    X 
74 Kotabe et al., 2003  X   X    X 
75 Almeida and Phene, 2004  X   X    X 
76 Argyres and Silverman, 2004 X    X    X 
77 Feinberg and Gupta, 2004 X X   X    X 
78 Oxley and Sampson, 2004 X    X    X 
79 Haas and Hansen, 2005     X   X  
80 Dyer and Hatch, 2006  X   X    X 
81 Szulanski and Jensen, 2006     X   X  
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California Management Review          
82 O'Dell and Grayson, 1998 X X   X    X 
83 Michailova and Husted, 2003 X X X X  X X   
          X 
Harvard Business Review          
84 Hansen et al., 1999 X X   X     
85 Wenger and Snyder, 2000  X  X X    X 
86 Brown and Duguid, 2000 X   X X  X X X 
87 Davenport and Glaser, 2002          
88 Gilmour, 2003 X X  X   X   
89 Van Alstyne, 2005 X   X   X   
Long Range Planning          
90 Teece, 2000 X X X X X X X X  
91 von Krogh et al., 2001 X  X  X    X 
92 Kaser and Miles, 2002  X X  X X X  X 
93 Goold, 2005 X X X  X   X X 
94 Söderquist, 2006 X    X    X 
MIT Sloan Management Review          
95 Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000b X X   X    X 
96 Storck and Hill, 2000  X   X  X  X 
97 Dyer and Hatch, 2004  X        
98 Hayashi, 2004  X  X X   X  
99 Yu, 2005 X X   X    X 
100 Fleming and Marx, 2006  X   X    X 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Of course, ”organisation” is no more ”ultimate” than that it, too, has to be explained in terms of individual action and interaction. That, however, lies outside 
of Figure 1.  
2  In other words, we subscribe to (a version of) methodological individualism. While we can build models that only involve macro (or “collective”) variables, 
and while we can, of course, conduct empirical analysis that only involves the macro level, ultimately macro variables and their interaction must be 
explainable in terms of individual action and interaction 
3 We owe this observation to one of the three reviewers. 
4 Note that when we speak here, and elsewhere in this paper, about “antecedents,” these also include what may be seen as “facilitators,” such as broad-band 
communication channels that are set up to facilitate knowledge sharing (cf. Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). 
5 The purpose of Elton Mayo's original experiment (later interpreted by Homans) was to find out how rewards would influence productivity. Surprisingly the 
researchers found that there was no effect. The key to understanding this is the informal group dynamics: cliques were formed so that management could be 
dealt with a unilateral manner and those who worked too much could be ostracized. The basic fear of the group of workers was that the reward system would 
lead to a lowering of the base rate in the reward system. 
6 See Becker and Huselid (2006) for a pertinent discussion in the context of strategic human resource management, which faces very similar levels challenges. 
